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Recent climate events such as Hurricane Harvey in Texas foreshadow the
dangers that could result from critical energy infrastructure failure in Canada due
to physical impacts caused by climate change. This article examines the types
of climate impacts that could affect critical energy infrastructure in Canada. The
article argues that these impacts translate into three types of corporate risk to the
owners and operators of the critical asset: economic risks to the infrastructure
asset; management and operational risks to the corporation; and risks arising
from corporate disclosure obligations. Applying the theoretical approach of “risk
management,” the article concludes that, on this approach, any effects of climate
impacts on the critical infrastructure asset will be limited to a narrow corporate risk.
By contrast, the paper argues that by applying an expanded understanding of the
critical energy infrastructure asset’s context, one where the critical infrastructure
asset is viewed as existing within its broader economic, social, and environmental
geography, a climate impact on the infrastructure asset is thus also a climate
impact on the infrastructure’s environment. On this broader understanding,
the risk of a climate impact may not fall solely upon the corporation, and the
public and governments may seek to expand their innuence over what adaptive
measures are required to ensure resilience of the asset. It can be anticipated that
increased public interest in the adaptation of critical energy infrastructure will
result in uncertainty and potential resistance by corporations. A new corporate
risk is likely to emerge.
Des événements climatiques récents comme l’ouragan Harvey, au Texas, laissent
présager les dangers qui pourraient résulter d’une défaillance des infrastructures
énergétiques essentielles au Canada en raison des impacts physiques causés
par les changements climatiques. Le présent article examine les types d’impacts
climatiques qui pourraient affecter les infrastructures énergétiques essentielles
au Canada. L’article fait valoir que ces répercussions se traduisent par trois types
de risques pour les propriétaires et les exploitants des infrastructures essentielles
: les risques économiques liés aux infrastructures, les risques opérationnels et de
gestion pour les sociétés et les risques découlant des obligations d’information
qu’ont les sociétés. En appliquant l’approche théorique de la « gestion des
risques », l’article conclut que, selon cette approche, les effets des impacts
climatiques sur les infrastructures essentielles seront limités à un risque limité pour
les sociétés. En revanche, l’article soutient qu’en appliquant une compréhension
élargie du contexte des infrastructures énergétiques essentielles, c’est-à-dire un
contexte dans lequel ces infrastructures sont considérées comme faisant partie
d’un ensemble économique, social et environnemental plus large, les impacts
climatiques sur les infrastructures sont donc également des impacts climatiques
sur l’environnement des infrastructures. Dans cette optique plus large, le risque
d’un impact climatique peut ne pas incomber uniquement à la société, et le public
et les gouvernements peuvent chercher à étendre leur innuence sur les mesures
d’adaptation nécessaires pour assurer la résilience de l’actif. On peut s’attendre à
ce que l’intérêt accru du public pour l’adaptation des infrastructures énergétiques
essentielles entraîne de l’incertitude et une résistance potentielle de la part des
entreprises. Un nouveau risque d’entreprise est susceptible d’apparaître.
*
Assistant Professor, University of Calgary, Faculty of Law. The author would like to acknowledge
the generous research funding of the Foundation for Legal Research and the Stikeman Elliot LLP
Fellowship in Corporate Law. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2018 Dalhousie
University Schulich School of Law Purdy Crawford Business Law Workshop. The author would like
to thank the participants of the workshop for their helpful comments.
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Introduction
Consider the role of infrastructure in the following climate event: when
Hurricane Harvey made landfall in Texas on 25 August 2017, little attention
was paid to the “500 chemical plants, 10 re¿neries and more than 6,670
miles of intertwined oil, gas and chemical pipelines [that] line the nation’s
largest energy corridor.”1 Harris County, home to Houston, also “hosts
more than two dozen current and former toxic waste sites designated under
the federal Superfund program. At least 14 of these sites—whose grounds
are contaminated with dioxins, lead, arsenic, benzene or other compounds
from industrial activities—were Àooded or damaged by Hurricane

1.
Associated Press, “Hurricane Harvey’s Toxic Impact Deeper Than Public Told,” Associated
Press (23 March 2018), online: <www.apnews.com/e0ceae76d5894734b0041210a902218d> [perma.
cc/S5AJ-NQXX]; See also United States Environmental Protection Agency, News Release, “PA/
TCEQ Harvey Update: Air Quality Improving, More Water Systems Operational” (6 September
2017), online: <https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epatceq-harvey-update-air-quality-improvingmore-water-systems-operational> [perma.cc/N4L6-TTJK].
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Harvey.”2 This catastrophic incident foreshadows the signi¿cant dangers
that could result from infrastructure failure due to physical impacts caused
by climate change, which this article terms “climate impacts.”
Canada’s 2009 National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure considers
infrastructure as critical where the asset is essential to the “health, safety,
security or economic well-being of Canadians.”3 Examples of such
assets, which this paper terms “critical energy infrastructure,” include
electricity generation and transmission infrastructure, oil and gas industry
infrastructure, maritime ports related to the energy sector, and railway
infrastructure. All of these classes of assets are vulnerable to the anticipated
and unanticipated effects of climate change.
This article examines climate impacts to critical energy infrastructure
assets in Canada from a corporate risk perspective. It breaks ground
by examining climate impacts on any one of these assets as an outright
corporate risk, which has the potential to manifest itself as follows. Climate
change events may not only cause GLUHFW impacts to a critical infrastructure
asset, resulting in a direct corporate risk, but also LQGLUHFW impacts, where
the economic, social, and environmental systems dependent on the critical
asset are affected by a climate event on the asset. The article explores the
implications of these direct and indirect impacts from the perspective of
the owners and operators of the critical assets and translates these climate
impacts into three corporate risks: economic risks; management and
operational risks; and risks arising from corporate disclosure obligations.
Economic risks are perhaps the most overt risks to the owners and
operators of the critical infrastructure asset. Here, a climate impact has
the potential to cause damage to the asset and reduce its operability and
resultant pro¿ts to the corporation. In addition, a climate impact may
require the asset to be rebuilt and may expose the corporation to liabilities
for environmental spills and potential contamination. Management and
operational risks from climate impacts pose challenges to the directors
2.
Hiroko Tabuchi & Sheila Kaplan, “A Sea of Health and Environmental Hazards in Houston’s
Floodwaters,” 7KH 1HZ <RUN 7LPHV (31 August 2017), online: <www.nytimes.com/2017/08/31/us/
houston-contaminated-Àoodwaters.html> [perma.cc/7H7H-K4XY].
3.
Canada, Public Safety Canada, 1DWLRQDO 6WUDWHJ\ IRU &ULWLFDO ,QIUDVWUXFWXUH , online:
<www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/srtg-crtcl-nfrstrctr/index-en.aspx>
[perma.cc/BT7XJCSH ] [1DWLRQDO6WUDWHJ\IRU&ULWLFDO,QIUDVWUXFWXUH]; for a current de¿nition of “climate adaptation”
see also Danny Bednar, Jonathan Raikes & Gordon McBean, “The Governance of Climate Change
Adaptation in Canada” (February 2018) ICLR Research Paper Series—number 60, online (pdf):
,QVWLWXWH IRU &DWDVWURSKLF /RVV 5HGXFWLRQ <www.iclr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/cca-climatechange-report-2018.pdf > [perma.cc/8K76-ANEE] which considers climate adaptation as “a complex
process of preparing for actual or projected changes in climate averages and extremes. This process
generally takes place in ¿ve stages. These stages overlap with the responsibilities and interests of a
multitude of actors, making the adaptation process complex” (LELGat 7).
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and of¿cers of the corporation, whereby a corporate risk may arise from
regulatory obligations to operate safe and reliable assets in the energy
infrastructure sector. Risks arising from corporate governance and
disclosure obligations may expose directors and of¿cers of the corporation
to strict penalties for inadequate or defective corporate disclosure.
Overall, these three corporate risks could expose directors and of¿cers
to corporate liability and may signi¿cantly affect the pro¿tability of the
corporation. This, in turn, will likely negatively affect the value of the
critical asset and the overall corporation. Further, the article argues that
when the indirect effects of a climate impact are factored into a corporate
risk analysis, a climate event has the potential to increase the overall
exposure of the owner or operator of the critical infrastructure asset to
what this paper calls a “new corporate risk.” This new risk could arise
due to greater public and governmental scrutiny in the management and
regulation of the critical infrastructure asset.
To address this corporate risk, the article focuses on the importance
of undertaking climate adaptation, “a process of adjustment in natural and
human systems to actual or expected climatic stimuli and their effects,”4 to
critical energy infrastructure in Canada. Despite its importance, adaptation
has not received the necessary attention in the global climate change
debate,5 which has predominantly focused on mitigation efforts,6 disaster
response to climate event risks,7 and climate change and insurance law.8
Encouragingly, climate adaptation as a corporate risk is gaining attention
in the literature,9 although the discussion remains somewhat limited,
4.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group II Contribution to the Fifth
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014:
Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability: Summary for Policymakers, (Toronto: Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, 2014), online (pdf): <www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/ar5_wgII_
spm_en-1.pdf> [perma.cc/N732-GBXF] at 5.
5.
Edna Sussman et al, “Climate Change Adaptation: Fostering Progress through Law and
Regulation,” 18:1 NYU Envtl LJ, 55 at 57.
6.
International Bar Association, IBA Climate Change Justice and Human Rights Task Force,
Achieving Justice and Human Rights in an Era of Climate Disruption (London: International Bar
Association, 2014), online: <www.ibanet.org/PresidentialTaskForceClimateChangeJustice2014Report.
aspx> [perma.cc/B9RZ-LCSX] at 87.
7.
Kevin Quigley, Ben Bisset & Bryan Mills, Too Critical to Fail: How Canada Manages Threats
to Critical Infrastructure (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2017). See also Jocelyn
Stacey, “Vulnerability, Disaster Law and ‘the Beast’” (2018) 55:4 Alta L Rev 853.
8.
Howard Kunreuther & Erwann Michel-Kerjan, “Encouraging Adaptation to Climate Change:
Long-Term Flood Insurance” (2009) Resources for the Future Issue Brief 09-13, online (pdf): <media.
rff.org/documents/RFF-IB-09-13.pdf> [perma.cc/2V93-KFED] at 2.
9.
Lee Godden et al, “Law, Governance and Risk: Deconstructing the Public-Private Divide in
Climate Change Adaptation” (2013) 36:1 UNSWLJ 224 (“In key private law areas, there have already
been moves to include climate change risk considerations within the scope of critical decision-making
domains such as directors’ duties.” at 236).
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focusing primarily on corporate disclosure requirements10 and corporate
law disputes grounded in climate adaptation.11
The overall objective of this article is to contribute to the active
resilience and climate adaptation debate12 by developing the argument
that direct and indirect climate impacts on critical infrastructure translate
into corporate risk to the owners and operators of the asset. The article
examines the inÀuence of corporate governance considerations in
establishing a framework for managing the physical impacts of climate
change on critical infrastructure in the energy industry and proceeds on the
understanding that “resilience to the physical impacts of climate change…
is vital for the long-term sustainable growth of a business.”13
The article is structured as follows. Part I explores the types of climate
impacts that are anticipated in relation to critical energy infrastructure
in Canada. Part II examines the concept of “critical infrastructure” and
de¿nes it for purposes of this article. Part III translates potential climate
impacts to critical energy infrastructure into three types of corporate risk:
economic risks to the infrastructure asset; management and operational
risks to the corporation; and risks arising from corporate disclosure
obligations.
In Part IV, the article argues for a broad understanding of climate
impacts on critical energy infrastructure. First, it considers the theoretical
approach of “risk management,” which tends to view the critical energy
infrastructure asset as a narrow corporate interest, and concludes that on
this approach, any effects of climate impacts on the asset are limited to a
10. Nina Hart, “Legal Tools for Climate Adaptation Advocacy: Securities Law” (2015) Sabin Center
for Climate Change Law, Columbia Law School White Papers, online: <academiccommons.columbia.
edu/doi/10.7916/D83R0S2Z> [perma.cc/737D-DF8Y].
11. JB Ruhl, “A Summary of Present and Future Climate Adaptation Law” (2013) Vanderbilt Public
Law Research Paper No 13-4, online: Social Sciences Research Network <ssrn.com/abstract=2214001>
[perma.cc/S5H9-VGSP] at 3.
12. Brian Chaf¿n, Hannah Gosnell & Barbara Cosens, “A Decade of Adaptive Governance
Scholarship: Synthesis and Future Directions” (2014) 19:3 Ecology and Society article 56; Thomas
Dietz et al, “The Struggle to Govern the Commons” (2003) 302:3652 Science 1907; Robin Kundis
Craig, “Trickster Law: Promoting Resilience and Adaptive Governance by Allowing Other
Perspectives on Natural Resources Management” (27 January 2019), Ariz J Envtl L & Pol’y,
[forthcoming], online: Social Sciences Research Network <ssrn.com/abstract=3323945> [perma.cc/
BQ88-6QE6]; for a timely discussion of risk and resilience in the Canadian context, see also Quigley,
supra note 7.
13. Australian Government, Department of Environment and Energy, National Climate Resilience
and Adaptation Strategy, (2015) at 7, online: <www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/adaptation/
publications/national-climate-resilience-and-adaptation-strategy> [perma.cc/9T5M-F2V3]. To this
end, this article does not directly address critical energy infrastructure in the context of climate
mitigation, or the risk of failed adaptation, so-called maladaptation. On maladaptation, see Jon Barnett
& Saffron O’Neill, “Minimising the Risk of Maladaptation: A Framework for Analysis” in Jean
Palutikof et al, eds, Climate Adaptation Futures (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2013).
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narrow corporate risk. The paper then argues for an expanded understanding
of the critical energy infrastructure asset’s context, one where the asset is
viewed as existing within a broader economic, social, and environmental
geography. On this understanding, a climate impact on critical energy
infrastructure is also a climate impact on the infrastructure’s environment,
thereby broadening and increasing corporate risk.
Part V of the article explores adaptation and resilience of the corporate
asset in this expanded context and discusses what those terms mean when
viewed through the lense of the theory of “risk management” and when a
broader geographical context is applied to the asset. Part VI develops the
argument that once the critical infrastructure asset is viewed in a broader
geographical context, the discussion of climate impacts has the potential to
take on a mixed private and public focus, due to the social and ecological
interconnections between the asset and its environment. This broader
interpretation will inÀuence decisions on how an infrastructure asset is
determined to be “critical,” as well as decisions on how future adaptation
responsibilities are to be allocated between private and public interests.
It can be anticipated that the increased public interest in the adaptation
of critical energy infrastructure will result in uncertainty and potential
resistance by corporations. A new corporate risk, resulting from direct and
indirect climate impacts to critical energy infrastructure, is therefore likely
to emerge. The article concludes with a call for leadership by the federal
government on climate adaptation to assist corporations in navigating this
new risk.
I. Anticipated climate impacts on Canadian energy infrastructure
Extreme weather and climate events will impact each region of Canada
differently. Climate change will also impact corporate operations in the
energy sector in different ways, speci¿cally the value of corporate assets
and their productivity. The literature distinguishes between “¿rst-order
impacts,” namely acute climate hazards that directly affect corporate
operations, including physical impacts, and “second-order impacts,”
which have broader economic, human and natural impacts within which
the corporation operates.14
Climate impacts will result in increases in temperatures and
correspondingly, in increased rates of evaporation of water sources.
Changes to the availability of water as a result of climate impacts are critical
14. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and Global Centre of Excellence on
Climate Adaptation, “Advancing TCFD Guidance on Physical Climate Risks and Opportunities”
(2018), online (pdf): <427mt.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/EBRD-GCECA_¿nal_report.pdf>
[perma.cc/4TSJ-D9MZ] [TCFD Guidance].
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to the energy infrastructure sector, where the generation of electricity
is dependent on the availability of cooling water15 or water supplies are
instrumental to industrial processes such as re¿ning operations. In the
event of anticipated droughts, power plants may therefore have to secure
alternative water supplies or undertake expensive conversion from wet
cooling16 to dry cooling.17 The opposite problem may also cause impacts
on critical energy infrastructure. As electricity generation infrastructure is
usually located near water, there is an increased risk of Àooding. Excess
water from Àooding can also affect the operations of other critical energy
infrastructure.18 For example, substations, which reduce high-voltage
transmission electricity into lower-voltage power for distribution, are
vulnerable to structural and operational damage caused by Àooding.19
Flooding can also disrupt critical transmission lines by Àooding tunnels
and destroying line support structures as well as natural gas and petroleum
supply systems. Hydroelectric power plants may be damaged or rendered
inoperable by the availability of too little or too much water, with dam
infrastructure damaged as a result of excess pressure on concrete dams.
Outdated Àood-risk projects may also no longer be accurate due to a
changing climate. Given the location in Canada of energy infrastructure
in coastal regions, such as the anticipated mega-projects on the Paci¿c
coastline to support Canada’s LNG industry, climate change may pose
serious challenges to the safe and reliable operation of that infrastructure.
Increased temperatures can have adverse effects on electricity generation
and transmission, and decrease generation ef¿ciency in thermoelectric
power plants.20 Higher temperatures increase power line resistance,
thereby reducing ef¿ciency, compounded by increased electricity demand
during periods of excess heat, which only increases operational power line
temperatures further.21 Increasing ambient temperatures are also causing

15. Marco Braun & Elyse Fournier, “Cooling for Thermal and Nuclear Power Generation in a Warmer
Climate” in Adaptation Case Studies in the Energy Sector: Overcoming Barriers to Adaptation (2016)
at 77, online (pdf): <www.ouranos.ca/publication-scienti¿que/ReportCaseStudies-EN.pdf> [perma.
cc/7JR4-4NWG] (report presented to Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation Division, Natural
Resources Canada) [Ouranos Report].
16. Ibid at Case Study 03.
17. Ibid at 34; see also ibid at Case Study 08.
18. Justin Gundlach & Romany Webb, “Climate Change Impacts on the Bulk Power System:
Assessing Vulnerabilities and Planning for Resilience” (2018) Sabin Center for Climate Change Law,
Columbia Law School at 10, online: Social Sciences Research Network <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=3128971> [perma.cc/FG77-EFKK].
19. Ouranos Report, supra note 15 at 13. For example, the 2013 Àoods in southern Alberta
completely destroyed an AltaLink substation.
20. Gundlach, supra note 18 at 7.
21. Ibid at 11.
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permafrost degradation in Canada’s Northern region. This has adverse
effects on critical infrastructure as the structures rely on permafrost for
stability, for example to support power lines, oil and gas pipelines or
water lines, resulting in potential snagging of the infrastructure. Rising air
temperatures are also contributing to increased forest ¿re risk, particularly
critical for Alberta’s oil sands industry which is surrounded by forests.22
Critical infrastructure assets such as pipelines and transmission lines, but
also railway tracks, pass through forested areas and hydroelectric plants
are often located in remote and forested areas.23
Erratic weather severity and frequency will also have notable impacts
on Canada’s critical energy infrastructure. High winds, anticipated to be of
particular concern to the Western and Atlantic regions,24 have the potential
to damage overhead power transmission lines. Heavy rainfall events can
cause washouts of power line and pipeline infrastructure foundations and
destroy ancillary infrastructure such as road and rail systems.25
Another major effect of climate change is relative sea level change.
Both the Atlantic and Paci¿c regions are facing risks associated with sea
level rise,26 which is often associated with coastal Àooding and storm
surges.27 For example, during Superstorm Sandy in New York State,
critical infrastructure assets were destroyed and damaged.28 Sea level
rise also increases the risk of coastal erosion, for example rendering
port infrastructure ineffective. Canada’s largest port, the Port of Metro
Vancouver, has been identi¿ed as critically vulnerable to the effects of sea
level rises.29
II. The concept of “critical infrastructure”
As illustrated in Part I above, the anticipated effects of climate impacts on
Canada’s energy infrastructure will vary widely and also have the potential

22. For a general discussion of the emergency response to the Fort McMurray ¿res see Stacey, supra
note 7.
23. Gundlach, supra note 18 at 6, 12.
24. Natural Resources Canada, Climate Risks & Adaptation Practices—For the Canadian
Transportation Sector 2016, by Kathy Palko & Donald Lemmen (Ottawa: Government of Canada,
2017), online (pdf): <www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/¿les/earthsciences/pdf/assess/2016/
ClimatRisk-E-ACCESSIBLE.pdf> [perma.cc/9WZZ-YSHM] at 68, 220.
25. Ibid at 68. (“Extreme precipitation events are a major concern in the Western region.”)
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid at 9.
28. City of New York v BP PLC, 325 F Supp (3d) 466 (NY State Ct 2018) (leave to appeal to 2nd
Cir granted) brief for appellant, online (pdf): <blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/
wp-content/uploads/sites/16/case-documents/2018/20181109_docket-18-2188_brief.pdf> [perma.cc/
BVX8-ZWDC]).
29. Adolf K Y Ng, Jason Monios & Huiying Zhang, “Climate Adaptation Management and
Institutional Erosion: Insights From A Major Canadian Port” (2018) 62:4 J Envtl Plan & Mgmt 586.

&RUSRUDWH5LVNDQG&OLPDWH,PSDFWVWR
&ULWLFDO(QHUJ\,QIUDVWUXFWXUHLQ&DQDGD



to overlap. For example, severe droughts may affect both the operative
ef¿ciency of an electricity power plant and also increase the risk of ¿res.
In addition, climate impacts on Canada’s energy infrastructure expose not
only the owners and operators of the critical asset, but have the potential to
impact and disrupt those depending on the critical asset, for example for the
purposes of generating and transmitting electricity or transferring oil and
gas by way of pipeline infrastructure. De¿ning what constitutes “critical”
infrastructure is therefore important for understanding the climate impacts
examined in Part I.
As a starting position, there is little consensus in the literature on
how to identify and determine an infrastructure asset as “critical.” A good
starting point, however, is Canada’s 2009 National Strategy for Critical
Infrastructure,30 which uses the following broad de¿nition:
Critical infrastructure refers to processes, systems, facilities, technologies,
networks, assets and services essential to the health, safety, security
or economic well-being of Canadians and the effective functioning of
government. Critical infrastructure can be stand-alone or interconnected
and interdependent within and across provinces, territories and national
borders. Disruptions of critical infrastructure could result in catastrophic
loss of life, adverse economic effects, and signi¿cant harm to public
con¿dence.

The strategy places the emphasis on economic and social interests, an
approach that is also reÀected in the action plans to implement the National
Strategy. The most recent plan, the National Cross Sector Forum 2018–
2020 Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure,31 predominantly focuses on
the convergence between the existing built infrastructure and the increased
evolution of cyber security risks.32 The plan also identi¿es Canada’s aging
infrastructure as an “emerging risk” which has the potential to result in
“increased risk of disruption”33 and “signi¿cant impacts of infrastructure
failure.”34 It is apparent that there is a strong public interest focus set out
in the federal government’s National Strategy.
In contrast to a broader economic and social approach to critical
infrastructure, it may also be possible to identify infrastructure as

30. National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure, supra note 3.
31. Public Safety Canada, National Cross Sector Forum, 2018–2020 Action Plan for Critical
Infrastructure (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2018) at 1, online (pdf): <publications.gc.ca/
collections/collection_2018/sp-ps/PS4-66-2018-eng.pdf>
[perma.cc/TE7Z-GPEN]
[2018-2020
Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure].
32. Ibid at 5.
33. Ibid at 6.
34. Ibid.
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“critical” based on a “sector-speci¿c” analysis. For example, the
designation of an energy infrastructure asset as “critical” may be found
in relevant legislation related to a speci¿c sector strategic to the Canadian
economy, such as the Emergency Management Act,35 the Energy Supplies
Emergency Act36 and the Marine Transportation Security Regulations37 at
the federal level. At a provincial level, the Alberta Electric Utilities Act38
sets out a list of infrastructure assets designated as “critical transmission
infrastructure.” In addition, the provincial mechanism implementing the
Emergency Management Act framework in Alberta includes a list of critical
infrastructure, which includes assets in the upstream petroleum sector.39
An alternative to the prescriptive legislative approach is a risk-based
approach. This process applies a “risk assessment” mechanism, drawing on
a broader evaluation based on a number of pre-determined factors, which
in turn rank infrastructure in order of critical importance. The advantages
of this approach is that it is highly subjective, that it may be undertaken
at different stages of the asset’s life-cycle assessment (for example during
scheduled maintenance), and that it can be fully integrated in corporate
management practices.40 For example, the Canadian Electricity Association
has prepared a sophisticated risk assessment and management process
for climate adaptation risks that anchors climate risks within business
and strategic planning practices.41 Central to this mechanism is a clear
prioritisation of risks and the continued monitoring and evaluating of the
effectiveness of risk mitigation efforts.42
For the purposes of our discussion, this article will proceed on the
understanding of critical infrastructure as set out in the National Strategy
for Critical Infrastructure. The strategy includes a broad de¿nition of
“critical” infrastructure, one which focuses on assets and systems that
are essential to the functioning of the Canadian economy and society.
35. Emergency Management Act, SC 2007, c 15, s 6 (requires federal Ministers to identify risks
related to critical infrastructure within their areas of responsibility and to prepare emergency
management plans in respect of those risks).
36. Energy Supplies Emergency Act, RSC 1985, c E-9, s 15 (gives the federal Cabinet the power to
implement mandatory allocation of petroleum products in case of real or anticipated shortages).
37. Marine Transportation Security Regulations, SOR/2004-144, s 329(d) (refers to critical marine
infrastructure).
38. Electric Utilities Act, RSA 2003, c E-5.1.
39. Security Management Regulation, Alta Reg 230/2012; Security Management for Critical
Upstream Petroleum and Coal Mining Infrastructure, Alta Reg 91/2013.
40. Canadian Electricity Association, “Adapting to Climate Change: A Risk Management Guide
for Utilities” (2017) at 13, online (pdf): <electricity.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Adapting_to_
Climate_Change-A_Risk_Management_Guide_for_Utilities.pdf > [perma.cc/XM5A-2TTB ] [Risk
Management Guide].
41. Ibid at 14.
42. Ibid at 16-18.
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The strategy therefore applies an expanded understanding of the asset’s
relevant context, which is discussed further in Part IV below.
III. Translating climate impacts into corporate risk
On a narrow interpretation of critical energy infrastructure, climate
impacts may appear to be localized and relatively containable, both from
an environmental and economic perspective. This is not the case, however,
in the highly networked and integrated energy infrastructure sector. In
integrated business models, a localized climate event can result in broader
service interruptions that may affect business operations beyond the
affected location.43 A recent report prepared for the Canadian electricity
generation and transmission sectors on climate change action identi¿ed the
sectors as priority areas for climate change adaptation, driven largely by
an understanding of economic, management and operational risks44 to the
supply and distribution of electricity.45 The vulnerability of a corporation
“to climate impacts goes well beyond the physical exposure of its facilities.
It includes supply chains, distribution networks, customers and markets.”46
For example, a shut-down of pipeline infrastructure in Canada as a result
of a climate event causing the rupture of a pipeline asset would have the
potential to result in signi¿cant environmental and economic harm well
beyond the physical location of the event. To this effect, Canada’s National
Strategy for Critical Infrastructure con¿rms that infrastructure owners and
operators possess the key expertise and information on their assets and
have primary responsibility “for protecting their assets and services.”47
The statement serves to establish a clear linkage between climate impacts
on an asset and the myriad services related to it and dependent on it.
Climate impacts on critical infrastructure raise serious challenges
for a corporation and its of¿cers. Failure to effectively manage assets has
been identi¿ed as a potential material risk in light of climate change.48 A
climate impact may result in the full scope of social and environmental

43. Daniel A Farber, “Climate Adaptation and Federalism: Mapping the Issues” (2009) 1 San Diego
J Climate & Energy L 259 at 267.
44. Laura Zizzo, Travis Allan & Joanna Kyriazis, “Understanding Canadian Electricity Generation
and Transmission Sectors’ Action and Awareness on Climate Change and the Need to Adapt”
(2014) at 10, online (pdf): <uwaterloo.ca/school-environment-enterprise-development/sites/
ca.school-environment-enterprise-development/¿les/uploads/¿les/understanding_canada_electricity_
generation.pdf> [perma.cc/24J6-LBFJ].
45. Risk Management Guide, supra note 40 at 5.
46. TCFD Guidance, supra note 15 at 15.
47. 2018–2020 Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure, supra note 31 at 1.
48. Sophie Marjanac & Lindene Patton, “Extreme weather event attribution science and climate
change litigation: an essential step in the causal chain?” (2018) 36:3 J Energy & Nat Resources L 265
at 294.
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social costs, as well as corporate costs in the shape of loss or damage to
the critical asset. Failure to adequately take climate adaptation risks into
consideration at a corporate level, or to undertake appropriate adaptation
to the infrastructure asset, could signi¿cantly expose the corporation. One
example of potential corporate liability could be grounded in a failure to
adequately consider “foreseeable risk to the interests of the company.”49
In addition, “failure to adequately disclose climate related risks or the
withholding of certain information from the market”50 may raise legal
issues for corporate of¿cers by way of corporate disclosure obligations
and securities fraud.
Corporations and their of¿cers should also be mindful of the linkages
between energy infrastructure assets and the wider climate change
liability debate. To date, climate change litigation has mostly focused on
arguments of climate change mitigation and tort liabilities arising from a
failure to undertake adequate mitigation efforts, including: (a) the failure
of corporations to adequately disclose knowledge of climate risks arising
from the burning of fossil fuels; (b) the failure to divest of fossil fuel-based
assets; and (c) questions of liability and attribution of corporate liability
for the effects of global climate change.51 Liability arising from a failure
to adequately adapt critical infrastructure assets against the actual and
anticipated effects of climate change has not yet been the focus of targeted
litigation against corporations. But as discussed below, this may change,
and corporate of¿cers should remain vigilant as to the disclosure of future
climate adaptation risks resulting from actual or anticipated climate
impacts to their critical infrastructure assets.
The potential climate impacts to critical energy infrastructure can
be translated into corporate risk in three ways: (a) economic risks to
the infrastructure asset; (b) management and operational risks to the
corporation; and (c) risks arising from corporate disclosure obligations.
Each are discussed below.

49. Ibid at 295, referring to the expert legal opinion on Australian corporate law by Noel Hutley
SC & Sebastian Hartford-Davis, “Climate Change and Directors’ Duties” (7 October 2016), online:
Minter Ellison Solicitors/Centre for Policy Development and the Future Business Council <cpd.
org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Legal-Opinion-on-Climate-Change-and-Directors-Duties.pdf>
[perma.cc/DN4H-BH4R].
50. See the discussion on the New York Martin Act and ongoing litigation related to ExxonMobil
regarding disclosure obligations of material information discussed in Marjanac, supra note 48 at 295296.
51. For a current overview of US and Non-US climate change litigation, see further the Climate
Change Chart of databases maintained by the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law at Columbia Law
School and Arnold & Porter, online: <climatecasechart.com/about/> [perma.cc/DQ2M-BJC2].
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1. Economic risks
The actual and anticipated impacts of climate change on critical energy
infrastructure include economic risks ranging from damage to the
infrastructure itself as a result of a climate event, to loss of productivity
and pro¿tability, and to increases in risks related to the failure of the
infrastructure resulting in potential environmental contamination and
liabilities.52 The ability of critical infrastructure to adapt is directly
inÀuenced by the age, composition and design of the asset.53
Thus, with infrastructure ageing, climate vulnerabilities will
correspondingly increase, requiring strategic investments in infrastructure
that may not have been anticipated in the economic calculations for the
life-cycle of the asset. Adaptation works should be prioritized and physical
resilience incorporated into scheduled maintenance works, upgrades and
retro¿ts of critical assets. This will minimize the risk of potential economic
impacts to the corporation resulting from damage to the asset or the need to
remove the asset from service due to climate impacts “ahead of schedule.54
For example, it is estimated that $300 billion will be invested in Canada’s
electricity infrastructure by 2030, a portion of which should be allocated
to adaptation works.55

2. Corporate management and operational risks
Directors and of¿cers must manage the business and affairs of the
corporation. Their duties include an obligation to exercise a duty of care,
to exercise sound business judgment, and to avoid conÀicts of interest.
Directors and of¿cers also owe ¿duciary duties to the corporation.56 In a
2016 study, a lack of a clear understanding of climate change was identi¿ed
as a key reason for why the energy industry had not yet adequately invested
in climate adaptation.57 A failure to anticipate and manage climate impacts
to critical energy infrastructure could amount to a breach of the obligations
owed by directors and of¿cers to the corporation.
In addition, corporate management and operational oversight of
critical energy infrastructure assets are subject to a detailed regulatory
environment. The electricity sector serves as a good example of how climate
adaptation may impose speci¿c management and operational obligations
52. Zizzo, supra note 44 at 10.
53. Jessica Boyle, Maxime Cunningham & Julie Dekens, “Climate Change Adaptation and Canadian
Infrastructure—A review of the literature” (2013) at 15, online: International Institute of Sustainable
Development <www.iisd.org/pdf/2013/adaptation_can_infrastructure.pdf> [perma.cc/X2SQ-RT7A].
54. Ibid at 11.
55. Ibid at 12.
56. See e.g. Canada Business Corporations Act, RSC 1985, c C-44, Part X.
57. Ouranos Report, supra note 15 at 110.
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upon the owners and operators of critical infrastructure. For example, the
Electric Utilities Act of Alberta provides that an owner of a transmission
facility must operate and maintain the facility “consistent with the safe,
reliable and economic operation of the interconnected electric system.”58
Statutory provisions impose obligations of due diligence and reasonable
care upon electricity utilities, obligations which will increase as climate
events become more frequent and as the critical infrastructure ages.59 For
example, failure to properly anticipate, prepare for or adapt to the effects
of climate change has been the subject of a number of lawsuits in the
United States against the federal government, including those following
the Hurricane Katrina catastrophe.60 It can be anticipated that similar
claims may be brought against the owners and operators of critical energy
infrastructure, namely on grounds of a failure to adequately comply with
the obligation to operate safe and reliable energy infrastructure. As Ruhl
correctly notes, “the topic of climate change adaptation and the law is
largely prospective…there is good reason to believe that the number
of measures meeting the “but for” test for identifying climate change
adaptation law will grow over time.”61 As such, a private law response
based on grounds of a “failure to adequately adapt,” for example in the
form of litigation against corporations for failing to undertake anticipatory
adaptation works, should be anticipated. Corporations and their of¿cers
should therefore be mindful of the inevitable risks posed by their corporate
decision making in relation to the operation of their critical energy
infrastructure assets.
3. Risks arising from corporate disclosure obligations
Current discussions on corporate disclosure obligations in the climate
change context are predominantly focused on holding corporations
accountable for their (in)actions on climate change mitigation. This
accountability forms the central focus of ongoing climate change litigation
and corporate shareholder activism efforts related to the corporation’s
failure to undertake adequate mitigation efforts.62
58. Electric Utilities Act, SA 2003, c E-5.1, s39(1). There is no caselaw or guidance on s 39 from the
Alberta Utilities Commission (AUC) charged with oversight of the statutory provision.
59. Zizzo, supra note 44 at 12.
60. Ruhl, supra note 11: “Nothing could more pointedly suggest this is a potential issue for climate
change adaptation law than the litigation against the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers following the
Hurricane Katrina levee failures” (ibid, at 26); See also Marjanac, supra note 48, “In the US, lawsuits
have already been ¿led seeking to hold governments responsible for damages resulting from failure to
adapt crucial infrastructure to shifting Àood risks” (ibid at 289).
61. Ruhl, supra note 11 at 20.
62. Marjanac, supra note 48 at 293, citing Sarah Barker, “Directors’ Duties in the Anthropocene:
Liability for Corporate Harm Due to Inaction on Climate Change” (2013), online (pdf): Responsible
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For example, as illustrated by a 2014 shareholder action to require
ExxonMobil to report on its corporate climate change and carbon asset
risks, investors are aggressively seeking disclosure of critical information
on companies’ climate risks related to their assets for purposes of investment
decisions and determining shareholder value.63 In the United Kingdom,
two energy companies were the subject of a complaint to the Financial
Reporting Council pursuant to disclosure obligations in the Companies
Act 2006. The complaint by ClientEarth64 alleged that Cairn Energy and
SOCO International failed to adequately disclose risks to the companies’
business operations and energy assets as a result of global climate mitigation
efforts to transition to a lower carbon-intensive economy. Following the
complaint, both companies made the disclosure voluntarily.65 However,
the Financial Reporting Council has not yet released the results of the
complaints or updated its guidance on climate risk reporting obligations.66
Increasingly, disclosure of climate adaptation risks, within broader
corporate disclosure documentation, is gaining the requisite attention.
In the adaptation context, disclosure is rightly considered “an important
tool for investigating or assessing corporations’ adaptation measures.”67
Guidance on this may be found in the Canadian Securities Administrators
(CSA) disclosure obligations on environmental matters.
Disclosure requirements on environmental-related matters are set
out in Environmental Reporting Guidance CSA 51-333.68 Relevant to a
discussion of climate impacts on physical assets are the provisions on
Investment Banking <responsible-investmentbanking.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/DirectorsDuties-in-the-Anthropocene-December-2013.pdf > [perma.cc/4J2W-89YX].
63. Marjanac, supra note 48 at 295.
64. See ClientEarth, “ClientEarth complaint prompts transformed climate reporting from oil and gas
companies” (27 April 2017), online: <www.clientearth.org/clientearth-complaint-prompts-transformedclimate-reporting-oil-gas-¿rms/> [perma.cc/4QFC-8QBN] [ClientEarth].
65. SOCO International plc, “Annual Report and Accounts 2016” (2016), online (pdf): SOCO
International <www.socointernational.com/private/downloads/qOaacpfBIv-J5lMBnHdUUQ/SOCO_
ARA16_DL_.pdf> [perma.cc/N972-9UZZ]: “global transition to a lower carbon intensity economy
in response to climate change could result in reduced demand and increased operating cost, capital
cost, regulation and taxation. Accordingly, it is a factor that impacts many of the Group’s principal
risks set out herein, including those associated with commodity price, reserves, operations, political,
stakeholder and reputational” (ibid at 30).
66. ClientEarth, supra note 64: the ClientEarth report notes that “despite explicit reference by
Cairn in its 2016 report to the FRC’s intervention, the regulator has yet to disclose the results of its
investigation, or to provide guidance to companies clarifying that climate risk reporting is required under
the law. ClientEarth has pressed the FRC to make its efforts more public…[the] two major companies
have updated their disclosure practices as a direct result of ClientEarth’s complaint to the FRC.”
67. Hart, supra note 10 at 2.
68. Canadian Securities Administrators, Staff Notice 51-333, Environmental Reporting Guidance,
(27 October 2010), online (pdf): Ontario Securities Commission <www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/
en/Securities-Category5/csa_20101027_51-333_environmental-reporting.pdf>
[perma.cc/4TCPMFEU].
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physical risks, for which “material disclosure” may have to be made.
Material disclosure may include details on “environmental matters, such
as the impacts of industrial contamination, changing weather patterns and
water availability.”69
In March 2017, the CSA announced that it would undertake a project
on “climate change-related risks and opportunities that impact an issuer and
its business.”70 The CSA project focused on physical assets, the changing
regulatory environment, and risks to existing business models in light of
climate change in Canada.71 The project included a strong emphasis on
adaptation as it excluded the effect an issuer has or may have on climate
change mitigation, from its scope. The CSA project report identi¿ed a
number of encouraging ¿ndings. Of the 78 issuers selected from the S&P/
TSX Composite Index for the report, 56 per cent reported that they made
speci¿c climate change-related disclosures.72 Those issuers not disclosing
climate change-related risks identi¿ed that they did not consider these risks
to rise to the level of materiality or probability of anticipated magnitude of
impacts.73 The report also noted that the oil and gas industry is “generally
more likely to include climate change-related disclosure in their regulatory
¿lings compared to other industries, especially with respect to regulatory
risks.”74
One of the more challenging ¿ndings of the CSA report is the
observation that “substantially all users expressed general dissatisfaction
with the current state of climate change-related disclosure.”75 One would
have expected the CSA to clarify the regulatory disclosure requirements
in the context of speci¿c climate change risks to the business, but such an
update is not presently anticipated. This leaves open the question of how
accurate a disclosure of “material information” on environmental risks and
management is, in the absence of more stringent reporting requirements
on climate change risks. For example, it would seem unclear whether a
disclosure pursuant to CSA 51-333 would require a corporation to report
on the risk of a corporate asset becoming a “stranded asset” because of
climate mitigation efforts (as reported voluntarily by Cairn Energy and
69. Ibid at 9.
70. Canadian Securities Administrators, Staff Notice 51-354, Report on Climate change-related
Disclosure Project (5 April 2018), online (pdf): Ontario Securities Commission <www.osc.gov.on.ca/
documents/en/Securities-Category5/csa_20180405_climate-change-related-disclosure-project.pdf>
[perma.cc/EFS8-H9WZ] [CSA Climate Risk Report]
71. Ibid at 6.
72. Ibid at 12.
73. Ibid at 14.
74. Ibid at 15.
75. Ibid at 18.
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SOCO International in the United Kingdom). Without direction from the
regulator, we do not know.
It will be of interest to see if the CSA revisits climate change-related
disclosure obligations in light of ongoing efforts at an international level
to standardize assessment methods and disclosure obligations of climaterelated risks through the Task Force on Climate-Related Disclosure.76
IV. Climate impacts as direct and indirect risks to the corporation
To date, the energy industry has predominantly considered the intersection
of climate change, infrastructure assets, and corporate risk from the
perspective of so-called “stranded assets.” Assets are “considered stranded
when they were prudently acquired but have lost economic value as a
direct result of an unforeseeable regulatory or legislative change speci¿c
to the industry in question.”77 As further developed below, the energy
infrastructure asset would become obsolete or “stranded” within a carbonconstrained economy that is focused on avoiding the worst impacts of
climate change through concerted mitigation efforts.78
For the purposes of our discussion, the argument may also be made
that, based on increased risks of climate impacts as examined in Part I
above, the critical energy infrastructure asset may become obsolete
or “stranded” as a result of damage from a climate impact, rendering
the asset inoperable or economically obsolete. This type of expanded
“stranded asset” risk could be termed the adaptation risk inherent in a
lack of progress on climate adaptation of the critical asset. This section
will therefore brieÀy draw upon existing examples of the risk of “stranded
assets” in the climate mitigation context so as to develop the argument that
a broader perception of corporate risk of stranded assets, in the adaptation
context, is necessary. What unites the discussion on both “stranded asset”
risks is that climate impacts on the critical energy infrastructure asset are
essentially direct risks to the critical asset. This will be contrasted with
a discussion below on indirect risks to the critical asset, where the asset
is viewed through an expanded understanding of the asset’s context to

76. Task Force on Climate-Related Disclose, “Final Report: Recommendations of the Task Force
on Climate-related Financial Disclosure” (June 2017), online: <www.fsb-tcfd.org/publications/¿nalrecommendations-report/> [perma.cc/2LMV-ZLAQ].
77. Robert D Cairns, “Stranded Oil of Erewhon” (2018) 121 Energy Policy 248 at 249, citing
Michael A Crew & Paul R Kleindorfer, “Stranded Assets in Network Industries in Transition” in
Michael A Crew, ed, Regulation Under Increased Competition (Boston: Kluwer, 1999) at 64.
78. For a helpful overview on the question of stranded assets and “unburnable carbon” investments
in Canada, see Marc Lee & Ellis Brock, Canada’s Carbon Liabilities the Implications of Stranded
Fossil Fuel Assets for Financial Markets and Pension Funds (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy
Alternatives, 2013) at 20.
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include broader social and environmental systems that may be affected by
the asset’s failure or damage beyond repair.
1. Climate impacts as a direct corporate risk
To date, from the perspective of corporations in the energy industry, the
focus has been on the risk of “stranded assets” as a result of global climate
mitigation efforts to transition to a low-carbon economy. This discussion
views climate mitigation efforts as essentially hostile to existing business
models and as posing a corporate risk. For example, as discussed further
below, Chevron, Exxon and Shell have reported on “climate change
risks” and the potential impact of climate change mitigation efforts on
the corporation’s business case, including its assets. Similarly, both Cairn
Energy and SOCO International voluntarily disclosed their corporate risk
of “stranded assets” as a result of climate change mitigation efforts.79 This
Part will build upon this discussion to broaden the concept of corporate
risk in the context of a lack of climate adaptation. As developed below,
the potential damage to critical energy infrastructure assets as a result of
climate impacts requires an expanded risk awareness, one which places
adaptation as the central objective in any corporate risk management
response to climate change. Essentially, a broader concept of corporate
risk is needed to include the risk of physical climate impacts.
To support the argument for a broader understanding of corporate
risk, one which includes climate impacts, the theoretical approach of “risk
management,” based on Miller’s integrated risk management framework,
is examined.80 Here, the asset, and the management of climate impacts on
the asset, are viewed from a narrow corporate risk perspective. The focus
is on strategic management responses by the corporation alone. In contrast,
by applying an expanded understanding of the asset’s relevant context,
one where the critical infrastructure asset is viewed as one existing within
a social and environmental geography, the effects of climate impacts
translate into a broader corporate, and potentially public, risk. Responses

79. ClientEarth, supra note 64.
80. Kent D Miller, “A Framework for Integrated Risk Management in International Business”
(1992) 23:2 J Intl Bus Stud 311. See also Benno Rothstein et al, “Impacts of Climate Change on
the Electricity Sector and Possible Adaptation Measures” in Ralf Antes & Bernd Hansjürgens,
eds, Economics and Management of Climate Change Risks, Mitigation and Adaptation (New York:
Springer, 2008) 231: “Climate change is becoming an increasingly relevant factor in the planning
processes of electricity companies since it affects all areas of the electricity sector, from production
via distribution to consumption. It is of paramount importance for electricity companies to de¿ne
adaptation measures in this new context so as to limit their risks and ¿nancial losses” (ibid at 239). See
also Ans Kolk, “Developments in Corporate Responses to Climate Change Within the Past Decade,”
ibid at 221.
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to climate impacts in this broader context may therefore extend beyond
those of the corporation.
2. Integrated risk management and direct corporate risk
Miller’s starting position is that the development of a strategy for the
management of corporate risks is one of the primary objectives of any
corporation.81 Historically, corporate risks were interpreted in isolation
in the literature but any corporate perspective on risk should give
“explicit consideration to numerous uncertainties.”82 On this basis, Miller
developed an “integrated risk management framework” which provides a
risk assessment framework for “identifying and assessing the many types
of uncertainties relevant to strategy formulation.”83 There are three groups
of risks faced by corporations which form part of Miller’s framework.84
Although reference is also made to social and natural uncertainties,85 the
focus is inherently narrow and is limited to the interests of the corporation
alone. This narrow focus can be seen by considering the current approach
to “stranded assets” in the critical energy infrastructure context.
The Alberta Court of Appeal, albeit in the context of determining
divestments of infrastructure assets for utility rate calculations, has
interpreted a “stranded asset” as an asset that “has lost its usefulness
before the end of its expected economic life. In other words, the asset has
not yet been fully depreciated but is no longer capable of being used.”86
Although public utilities are not, strictly speaking, akin to corporate
owners of infrastructure assets, two notable decisions of the Alberta
Utilities Commission (AUC) may be of interest to our discussion of the
theory of risk management in the climate change context. Interestingly,
the AUC reached contrasting decisions on the issue of the recovery of
undepreciated costs of damaged infrastructure assets as a result of climate
impacts. In a decision arising from the 2011 wild¿res in the Slave Lake
region87 and their effects on electric distribution infrastructure, the AUC

81. Miller, supra note 80 at 312.
82. Ibid at 312.
83. Ibid at 328.
84. Ibid, these are “environmental uncertainties” (factors that affect the business context across
industries); “industry uncertainties” (related to market uncertainty, product uncertainty, and
competitive uncertainty); and “¿rm uncertainty” (¿rm-speci¿c factors).
85. Ibid at 314, “natural uncertainties” include variations in rainfall, hurricanes and other natural
disasters.
86. FortisAlberta Inc v Alberta (Utilities Commission), 2015 ABCA 295, at para 20.
87. Re ATCO Electric Ltd: 2012 Distribution Deferral Accounts and Annual Filing for Adjustment
Balances (29 October 2014), 2014-297, online: Alberta Utilities Commission <www.auc.ab.ca/
regulatory_documents/ProceedingDocuments/2014/2014-297_Errata.pdf> [perma.cc/8Y2K-3YL2].
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ruled that these costs could not be recovered.88 By contrast, costs arising
from the impacts of the 2013 Southern Alberta Àood89 on gas distribution
infrastructure could be recovered.90 These divergent results have recently
been revisited in academic commentary, which has criticized the AUC’s
outcomes as arbitrary based on its reasoning that a utility “can recover
stranded asset costs where the assets are stranded by a mechanism or event
of a type and magnitude that the utility has experienced in the past.”91 It
will interesting to observe if the AUC, albeit within the narrow ¿eld of
utility cost recovery, will change its stance on stranded assets in light of
the increasing recognition and evidence of the now predictable nature of
climate impacts in Canada.
Further, in the narrow context of managing corporate risks of
stranded assets, it is noteworthy that in 2018, a number of international
energy companies published reports addressing “climate change risks” to
their operations as a result of global climate change mitigation efforts.
The reports highlight the corporation’s response to climate change risks
and efforts to maintain corporate “resilience.” For our discussion, these
documents provide helpful insight into current corporate perceptions of
global climate mitigation efforts as a corporate risk, and the assessment of
the risk of stranded assets.
Chevron’s “Climate Change Resilience” report discusses that
“some assets may become “stranded” as unproduced reserves become
uneconomical due to potential future regulations”92 arising from climate

88. Ibid at para 66: “In the Commission’s view it is the characteristics of the event that are relevant
to the determination of whether the event had been contemplated or anticipated by a prior depreciation
study. If the characteristics of the Slave Lake ¿res event are suf¿ciently different to distinguish the Slave
Lake ¿res from the events considered in the previous depreciation study such that the characteristics
of the Slave Lake ¿res cannot be said to have been reasonably contemplated or anticipated in the
determination of the depreciation parameters in that study, then the Commission would consider the
event to give rise to an extraordinary retirement and the $400,000 notional net book value of the
destroyed assets would be for the account of the shareholders.”
89. Re ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd: Z Factor Application for Recovery of 2013 Southern Alberta
Flood Costs (16 March 2016), 2738-D01-2016, online: Alberta Utilities Commission <www.auc.
ab.ca/regulatory_documents/ProceedingDocuments/2016/2738-D01-2016.pdf>
[https://perma.cc/
YRC7-M9EU].
90. Ibid at para 93: “The characteristics of the 2013 Àood event are of a similar nature to the 2005
Àood event that was incorporated in the 2009 depreciation study. Relying on this ¿nding of fact,
the Commission concludes that the 2013 Àood does not give rise to an extraordinary retirement of
the destroyed assets and therefore the undepreciated net book value of $496,747 will continue to be
recovered from ratepayers”.
91. Lou Cusano et at, “Prudence, Stranded Assets, And the Regulation Of Utilities: A Review of
Alberta Utility Regulatory Principles in a Post-Stores Block Era” (2018) 56:2 Alta L Rev 403 at 433.
92. Chevron Corporation, “Climate Change Resilience—A Framework for Decision Making”
(2018) at 25, online (pdf): <www.chevron.com/-/media/shared-media/documents/climate-changeresilience.pdf> [perma.cc/GR97-BKGD].
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change mitigation efforts. The report con¿rms, however, that although
there is the possibility that “not all oil and gas assets will get produced,”93
Chevron takes “carbon pricing into account where appropriate in our
business planning to avoid having stranded assets.”94 Shell’s “Energy
Transition Report” sees the risk of stranded assets in its current portfolio
of assets as low,95 in part due to Shell’s strategy of producing 80 per cent of
current proven oil and gas reserves by 2030. Shell’s active diversi¿cation
of its investments, including into electricity generation from renewable
sources such as wind and solar contributes to a low-risk of stranded assets
and “the risk of having assets that are uneconomic to operate, or oil and
gas reserves that are uneconomic to produce because of changes in demand
or CO2 regulations.”96 ExxonMobil’s “Energy & Carbon Summary:
Positioning for a Lower-Carbon Energy Future” does not explicitly refer
to stranded assets but notes that under oil and gas demand projections to
2040, which include a 2-degree scenarios average, “it is possible that some
higher-cost assets, which could be impacted by many factors including
future climate-related policy, may not be developed.”97
As set out above, these key energy corporations view climate risks as
narrow risks which may affect business continuity as a result of climate
mitigation efforts. The focus on climate risks is thus limited to stranded
assets, in response to the risk of changing climate policy parameters,
including the cost of carbon. No reference is made to risks arising to
critical energy infrastructure from physical climate impacts on corporate
assets.
3. &OLPDWHLPSDFWVDVDQLQGLUHFWFRUSRUDWHDQGVRFLDOULVN
In the 2017 Shell Annual Report, in a section entitled “Our Strategy on
Climate Change,” Shell refers to physical risk as a “potential impact on
our facilities and WKHFRPPXQLWLHV in which we operate due to changing
physical conditions.”98 This statement illustrates the fact that it is likely
necessary to apply a broader understanding to the question of physical
93. ,ELG.
94. ,ELG.
95. Shell plc, “Energy Transition Report” (April 2018) at 37, online (pdf): <https://www.shell.com/
energy-and-innovation/the-energy-future/shell-energy-transition-report/_jcr_content/par/toptasks.st
ream/1524757699226/3f2ad7f01e2181c302cdc453c5642c77acb48ca3/web-shell-energy-transitionreport.pdf> [perma.cc/6GCX-3CSU].
96. ,ELG at 30.
97. ExxonMobil Corporation, “Energy & Carbon Summary: Positioning for a Lower-Carbon Energy
Future” (February 2018) at 14, online (pdf): <corporate.exxonmobil.com/-/media/Global/Files/
energy-and-carbon-summary/Energy-and-carbon-summary.pdf> [perma.cc/XSZ7-S2TM].
98. Shell plc, “Annual Report and Form 20F 2017” (2017) at 65, online: <reports.shell.com/annualreport/2017/?accept=1> [perma.cc/LTP2-PBA5] [emphasis added].
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climate impacts on critical energy infrastructure, one which considers the
critical energy infrastructure ZLWKLQ its broader geographical context.
To develop such an expanded understanding of the asset’s context,
this section builds upon Ottaviano’s broader discussion of the role of
infrastructure in affecting economic geography99 and the risk regulation
regime framework developed by Hood et al, which argues that context
shapes the manner in which risk is regulated.100 An expanded understanding
of the asset’s context as advocated in this paper necessarily focuses on
the critical energy infrastructure asset DVLWFRH[LVWV with its geographical
environment. Such a broader context allows for a discussion of corporate
risk arising from climate impacts in a manner that goes beyond a strict
economic interest in the corporate asset. For example, any climate impact
on the asset is also an impact on its geographical environment, including
its economic and social aspects. A good example to return to is Hurricane
Harvey in Houston in 2017. The hurricane resulted not only in physical
impacts on Houston’s critical energy infrastructure, but also caused,
and continues to cause, widespread economic, social and environmental
impacts beyond the assets involved. This example illustrates that the risks
associated with climate impacts can extend beyond the corporation to the
geographical system within which the asset is located.
By examining the critical infrastructure asset within its broader
geographical location and context, a different emphasis is placed
on the role of the infrastructure asset. In contrast to the theory of risk
management, this broader understanding of the critical infrastructure
asset’s context does not view the asset as solely a private corporate asset.
Instead, the asset is viewed as having a public dimension. This is because
the public depends upon the existence of the critical infrastructure asset.
As set out in Canada’s National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure, critical
energy infrastructure contributes to achieving a functioning society and
economy.101 Moreover, the critical infrastructure asset may support the
geographic location, for example by connecting it to critical energy
supplies and resources and by way of economic contributions. In the event
that the asset suffers a climate impact, the geographical context within
99. Gianmarco Ottaviano, “Infrastructure and Economic Geography: An Overview of Theory and
Evidence” (2008) 13:2 Eur Investment Bank Papers 8.
100. Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein & Robert Baldwin, 7KH*RYHUQDQFHRI5LVN8QGHUVWDQGLQJ
5LVN5HJXODWLRQ5HJLPH(Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001), discussed in detail in Quigley, VXSUD
note 7 at 49.
101. 1DWLRQDO6WUDWHJ\IRU&ULWLFDO,QIUDVWUXFWXUH, VXSUD note 3, which de¿nes critical infrastructure as
the “processes, systems, facilities, technologies, networks, assets and services essential to the health,
safety, security or economic well-being of Canadians and the effective functioning of government”
(LELGat 2).

&RUSRUDWH5LVNDQG&OLPDWH,PSDFWVWR
&ULWLFDO(QHUJ\,QIUDVWUXFWXUHLQ&DQDGD



which it is located may suffer economically and socially. An analogy
can be drawn with the historical coal mining towns of Alberta and their
economic, social and environmental transition in light of Alberta’s phaseout of coal production.102 The infrastructure asset is now defunct, and the
geography within which the asset is located, correspondingly affected.
On this reasoning, a restrictive economic risk management theory is
replaced by a broader focus, one where private and public interests in the
critical infrastructure asset are potentially aligned to address the direct
and indirect effects of a climate impact. This approach recognizes that
a climate impact on critical energy infrastructure is likely to affect the
infrastructure’s economic, social, and environmental context. On such an
expanded approach, the physical resilience of the critical infrastructure
asset to climate impacts will include social and ecological resilience,
which Adger terms “fair adaptation.”103

V. Expanding the concept of adaptation
Although there is no universal de¿nition of “climate adaptation,” Article
7 of the Paris Agreement provides guidance by setting out a global goal
of “enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing
vulnerability to climate change in the context of the temperature goal of the
Agreement.”104 In addition, the de¿nition of “critical infrastructure” from
Canada’s National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure of 2009 examined
above emphasizes that the objective of climate adaptation is to achieve
resilience of the infrastructure in an economic and ecological context.105
What do we mean by “resilience” and how does this objective manifest
itself within climate adaptation? As a starting position, formulating a
strategy for adaptation to climate impacts “requires a speci¿c meaning
to be given to resilience by de¿ning the public interest.”106 For this, we
can borrow the de¿nition of “resilience” from the United States Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission as “[t]he ability to withstand and reduce
102. Alberta, “Phasing out Coal Pollution,” online: <www.alberta.ca/climate-coal-electricity.aspx>
[perma.cc/8QKZ-B3WG]. See also, Lauren Vriens, “The End of Coal: Alberta coal phase-out, 2015,”
online (pdf): International Institute of Sustainable Development <www.iisd.org/sites/default/¿les/
publications/alberta-coal-phase-out.pdf> [perma.cc/9QQC-2AKA].
103. W Neil Adger, “Emerging Dimensions of Fair Process For Adaptation Decision-Making” in
Jean Palutikof et al, eds, Climate Adaptation Futures (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2013). See also
Nilufar Matin, John Forrester & Jonathan Ensor “What Is Equitable Resilience?” (2018) 109 World
Development 197.
104. Paris Agreement, 12 December 2015, FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (entered into force 4 November
2016), online: <unfccc.int/¿les/essential_background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_
agreement.pdf> [perma.cc/N3EM-ZSTN].
105. National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure, supra note 3.
106. Andrea Keessen et al, “The Concept of Resilience from a Normative Perspective: Examples
from Dutch Adaptation Strategies” (2013) 18:2 Ecology & Soc’y 45, at 45.
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the magnitude and/or duration or disruptive events, which includes the
capability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and/or rapidly recover from such
an event.”107
On such an understanding of resilience, physical resilience would be
achieved by decreasing the vulnerability of the asset to climate impacts. The
critical question, from the perspective of the corporation, is ZKDWW\SHRI
UHVLOLHQFH adaptation should achieve. For example, should adaptation aim
to offer protection against the direct physical effects of climate impacts on
the critical infrastructure asset only (i.e., limit adaptation to GLUHFW climate
impacts on the asset)? Or, should the strategy focus on achieving a EURDGHU
adaptation goal to achieve social and environmental resilience? From the
perspective of the corporation, this is the core question for purposes of
developing an appropriate adaptation strategy and assessing corporate risk.
1. 'LYHUJHQWDSSURDFKHVWRULVNFRUSRUDWHYHUVXVVRFLRHFRORJLFDO
As introduced in Part IV above, if the adaptation strategy adheres to a
narrow theory of corporate risk management, the focus is limited to the
interests of the corporation only. The corporation as owner and operator of
the critical infrastructure asset will pursue a focused strategy of resilience
to protect the asset against climate impacts. The scope of resilience is
therefore narrow, with a strong emphasis on the private aspect of the asset.
This translates into an adaptation strategy that is limited to the self-interest
of the corporation in its protection of the corporate asset and reduction of
corporate risk. Correspondingly, there is limited scope for public concerns
to be reÀected in the adaptation strategy.
When the objective of achieving resilience of critical infrastructure
is broadened pursuant to an expanded understanding of the critical
infrastructure asset’s context as developed in Part IV above, the focus of
the adaptation strategy is correspondingly widened in scope. The overall
resilience potential is increased. Any discussion of protection of the asset
against climate impacts will now include the socio- and environmental
aspects of the geographical context which supports the asset. The adaptive
response is therefore localised in the geography; it is “context-speci¿c,
place-based, grounded in local structures and situations.”108 Important
socio-environmental components that would otherwise be excluded are
now included.

107. Gundlach, VXSUD note 18 at 1.
108. Jana-Axinja Paschen & Ray Ison, “Narrative Research in Climate Change Adaptation—
Exploring a Complementary Paradigm for Research and Governance” (2014) 43:6 Research Pol’y
1083 at 1085.
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The distinction between the two approaches is critical to the overall
risk of corporations arising from climate impacts to their critical energy
infrastructure assets. The more expansive the adaptation focus, the greater
the SXEOLF involvement in the adaptation discussion becomes. But how do
we demarcate the geographical context that will be considered? Guidance
may be found in the literature of adaptive management.
2. /HVVRQVIURPDGDSWLYHPDQDJHPHQW
Applying a broader concept of corporate risk, one where climate impacts
on the critical infrastructure asset are viewed as an indirect corporate risk,
necessarily invites a comparison with ecology and the adaptive management
of ecosystems. As a starting position, there must be a recognition that the
critical infrastructure asset is a component of a wider “social–ecological
system…in which people depend on resources and services provided by
ecosystems, and ecosystem dynamics are inÀuenced, to varying degrees,
by human activities.”109
The &RQYHQWLRQRQ%LRORJLFDO'LYHUVLW\ sets out a mechanism for an
“ecosystem approach” which promotes the conservation and sustainable
use of ecosystems.110 The ecosystem approach, in turn, is dependent
on a system of “adaptive management” to “deal with the complex and
dynamic nature of ecosystems and the absence of complete knowledge or
understanding of their functioning.”111 Applying an adaptive management
mechanism to the question of climate adaptation, it can be argued that
the uncertainties of climate impacts on critical infrastructure should
require a similar emphasis on Àexibility to respond to changing social
and ecological conditions, as is set out in Principle 9 of the ecosystem
approach.112 Furthermore, adaptive management includes a strong
monitoring mechanism of both socio-economic and ecological factors.
It is this emphasis on Àexibility, and on a mechanism to respond to
changing ecological conditions through monitoring, which suggests that
adaptive management could act as a model for future climate adaptation
mechanisms. In his work, Olszynski has examined the practice of adaptive
management in Alberta’s energy resources sector in relation to coal and

109. F Stuart Chapin III et al, 3ULQFLSOHV RI (FRV\VWHP 6WHZDUGVKLS 5HVLOLHQFH%DVHG 1DWXUDO
5HVRXUFH0DQDJHPHQWLQD&KDQJLQJ:RUOG, 1st ed (New York: Springer, 2009) at chapter 1.
110. &RQYHQWLRQ RQ %LRORJLFDO 'LYHUVLW\, 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79; 31 ILM 818 (entered into
force 29 December 1993) [&%'].
111. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, “The Ecosystem Approach” (2004) at 6,
online (pdf): &RQYHQWLRQRQ%LRORJLFDO'LYHUVLW\ <https://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/ea-text-en.
pdf> [perma.cc/X3FT-EDKC].
112. &%', VXSUDnote 110, Principle 9.
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oil sands mining projects, and in situ oil sands operations.113 These studies
may assist in providing the rationale for, and delineating the scope of
impacts to be included in climate adaptation efforts.114
This discussion of adaptive management con¿rms that a broader
approach to climate adaptation will not only capture direct private
corporate interests, but will also allow for indirect public interests (such
as social and environmental considerations) to form part of any adaptation
discussion. Essentially, the key question is how to demarcate the extent of
the corporate risk arising from climate impacts to the critical infrastructure
asset within its geographic location; it is a question of scale. The greater
the scale of the geographic context, the broader the corporate risk will be.
A broader theoretical treatment of the infrastructure asset will also
inÀuence the questions of whether the asset is considered “critical”
and, if so, critical to whom? This may expose the corporation to greater
public scrutiny over the company’s infrastructure assets and adaptation
responses. Such an enhanced public scrutiny has the potential to create a
new corporate risk.
VI. A new corporate risk
To date, corporate risk arising from physical climate impacts to energy
infrastructure has largely been limited to direct impacts to the critical
asset, as seen when the theory of risk management is applied to the
asset. But when the critical energy infrastructure asset is viewed within
a broader social and environmental context, the risk of a climate impact
may therefore not be limited to the corporation. Because of the public
dimension involved, governments and public interest groups may want
to expand their role in inÀuencing how critical energy infrastructure is
adapted. From the perspective of the corporation, this may manifest itself
in a new corporate risk, one where the corporation will have to navigate
climate adaptation objectives that pursue both private and public interests.
1. Private and public adaptation objectives
Consider the new corporate risk in the following example. An interprovincial pipeline may not be a critical asset to the corporation owning
the asset if it does not connect into a transmission network. In turn, a
113. See Martin Olszynski, “Failed Experiments: An Empirical Assessment of Adaptive Management
in Alberta’s Energy Resources Sector,” (2017) 50:3 UBC L Rev 657; see also Arlene Kwasniak, “Use
and Abuse of Adaptive Management In Environmental Assessment Law And Practice: A Canadian
Example and General Lessons,” (2010) 12:4 J Envtl Assessment Pol’y & Mgmt 425.
114. See e.g. ibid at 733-734 where the author discusses the proposed adaptive management
mechanism for the Shell Canada Jackpine Oilsands mine, which included a broad scope of surface and
groundwater management; climate change impacts; ¿sh and ¿sh habitat; socioeconomic and health
issues; and reclamation obligations.
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smaller energy infrastructure project may be critical to a remote local
community if it is the only electricity transmission infrastructure that
connects the community to a central electricity grid. Any discussion of
“critical” must therefore distinguish between a classic “ownership”
approach and a broader “social” approach. In addition, the question of
“critical to whom?” may be inÀuenced by the fact that segments of the
infrastructure may be owned by different parties, especially when dealing
with networked or linear infrastructure projects. The potential for both
private and public adaptation objectives is apparent.
Given these objectives, the allocation of responsibilities for
undertaking climate adaptation to critical energy infrastructure will be
challenging. From the perspective of the corporation, managing risks from
climate impacts may not be a new challenge, but rather, “an extension of
existing risk management.”115 This supports a strong corporate autonomy
argument for any climate adaptation response. In principle, responsibility
for managing climate risks should lie with the private owners and operators
of the critical infrastructure asset, as the party “best placed to manage
them.”116 Without adaptation, the energy industry runs a risk of signi¿cant
losses. As a result, the owners and operators of critical infrastructure assets
have a vested interest to manage this risk and adaptation must be “initiated
in advance, as a precautionary measure.”117 In the National Cross Sector
Forum 2018–2020 Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure, the federal
government allocated the responsibility to “collaboratively manage
risks related to…critical infrastructure”118 to the owners and operators
of critical assets. Responsibilities placed upon the private sector include
identifying critical infrastructure assets,119 providing data and projections,
and developing and promoting industry standards.120
The private sector may, however, push back on assuming sole
responsibility for undertaking climate adaptation measures. Owners
and operators of critical infrastructure may invoke the “public good”
nature of their assets to resist responsibility for undertaking adaptation.
With respect to regulation, the energy industry may view any climate
115. National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility, “Roles and Responsibilities for Climate
Change Adaptation in Australia” (2012) at 1, online: <www.nccarf.edu.au/sites/default/¿les/18dccee-2012.pdf> [perma.cc/28GC-ZBTA].
116. Ibid at 3.
117. Tina Schneider, “Responsibility for private sector adaptation to climate change” (2014) 19:2
Ecology 8.
118. 2018–2020 Action Plan for Critical Infrastructure, supra note 31 at Appendix A: Roles and
Responsibilities.
119. Ibid.
120. Bednar, supra note 4 at 51-52.
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adaptation requirements with potential hostility, given that adaptation will
mean expenditure on risk management that is still, largely, perceived as
“indeterminate.”121 There are also strong market dynamics and competition
aspects to adaptation.122 Competitive concerns may act as a disincentive to
collaborate on adaptation or may be prohibited by competition law at the
risk of market dominance or illegal collusion.
The anticipated scale of climate impacts will mean that inevitably,
corporate interests in the critical infrastructure asset will intersect with
the public domain, especially on the key issues of responsibility for
undertaking adaptation and who should pay for the adaptation. Critical
questions related to the jurisdictional divide between the federal and
provincial governments in Canada over climate adaptation are far from
clear.123 They form part of the broader jurisdictional complexities related
to energy and environmental matters.124 The question of jurisdiction
over climate adaptation is therefore both a legal and political one, where
demarcations between the federal and provincial governments remain
unclear.125 Given these uncertainties, the federal government to date has
not assumed a central role in leading adaptation policy in Canada.126
In the 2016 Federal Adaptation Policy Framework, the federal
government described its role as that of advisor only. It stated that its
role is not to “prescribe how or when to adapt but to facilitate others’
actions.”127 On review, the Of¿ce of the Auditor General of Canada
(OAG) in 2017 concluded that the federal government’s action on climate
adaptation was “insuf¿cient.”128 The OAG found that Environment and
121. Quigley, supra note 7 at 61.
122. Ibid at 57.
123. Canadian Climate Change Adaptation Platform, Infrastructure and Buildings Working Group,
“Adaptation State of Play Report” (March 2017) at 48, online: Canadian Risks and Hazards
Network <www.crhnet.ca/sites/default/¿les/library/IBWG_SoP_Final.pdf> [perma.cc/836A-6MU7]
[Adaptation State of Play Report].
124. In the context of developing oil and gas pipelines in Canada, see Nigel Bankes, “Pipelines and
the Constitution: A Special Issue of the Review of Constitutional Studies” (2018) 23:1 Rev Const Stud
1; George Hoberg, “Pipelines and the Politics of Structure: Constitutional ConÀicts in the Canadian
Oil Sector” (2018) 23:1 Rev Const Stud 53.
125. Adaptation State of Play Report, supra note 123 at 49.
126. Bednar, supra note 4 at 46-49.
127. Canada, Environment Canada, Federal Adaptation Policy Framework (Ottawa: Environment
Canada, 2016) at 1-2, online: <www.canada.ca/content/dam/eccc/migration/cc/content/2/
b/2/2b2a953e-756b-4e8c-a2ba-3fbdc3324dba/4214_federal-20adaptation-20policy-20framework_
en.pdf> [perma.cc/W2W3-PVL6].
128. Canada, Of¿ce of the Auditor General of Canada, Reports of the Commissioner of the
Environmental and Sustainable Development to the Parliament of Canada: Report 2—Adapting to
the Impacts of Climate Change (Ottawa: Of¿ce of the Auditor General of Canada, 2017) at 27, online:
<http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2017/bvg-oag/FA1-26-2017-1-2-eng.pdf> [perma.
cc/Q77E-NAB5].
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Climate Change Canada had not integrated adaptation measures into its
own policies and programs. Moreover, it had not provided satisfactory
leadership or resources to other agencies on adaptation. This was the
case despite the Department’s stated policy to facilitate adaptation and to
provide leadership by example.129
Although some provincial governments have attempted to ¿ll the void
left by the federal government’s inaction on climate change,130 a further
OAG report in 2018 identi¿ed the inadequate preparation by the provinces
to the challenge of climate adaptation.131 To date, only Nova Scotia has
assessed the potential impacts of climate change and has developed the
requisite adaptation requirements.132 By contrast, several provinces have
limited their engagement with climate adaptation to performing adaptation
assessments on isolated sectors of their economy.133 Others have launched
more general adaptation strategies, such as British Columbia’s 2010
Climate Adaptation Strategy, where the focus is on building knowledge
and implementing adaptation into general government planning.134 Given
that the provinces are well-placed to undertake and to support corporations
in their climate adaptation efforts, one would expect more guidance.
For example, many provinces supply public utilities through Crown
corporations, thereby holding valuable practical knowledge relevant to
climate adaptation of critical energy infrastructure.135
This lack of action on the part of both levels of government means
that climate adaptation has not yet arrived at the forefront of governmental

129. Ibid at 5.
130. Brendan Boyd, “Working Together on Climate Change: Policy Transfer and Convergence in
Four Canadian Provinces” (2017) 47:4 Publius: J Federalism 546.
131. Canada, Of¿ce of the Auditor General of Canada, Perspectives on Climate Change Action in
Canada Collaborative Report from Auditors General: Perspectives on Climate Change Action in
Canada (2018) at Exhibit 5, online: <www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_otp_201803_e_42883.
html#> [perma.cc/MFW6-N5UU].
132. Ibid at Exhibit 6, which notes in the context of Nova Scotia that “the government had not
reviewed the assessment since 2005 to see whether changes to risk ratings were needed, and not all
departments were involved in the adaptation planning process.”
133. Ibid at Exhibit 6. For example, the British Columbia government assessed climate risks to the
mining and agriculture sectors. As of 2019, the British Columbia Ministry of Transportation and
Infrastructure requires new projects to consider future climate projections and to include adaptation
mechanisms: British Columbia, Technical Circular T-04/19, “Resilient Infrastructure Engineering
Design - Adaptation to the Impacts of Climate Change and Weather Extremes” (27 March 2019).
134. British Columbia, Ministry of Environment, Preparing for Climate Change: British Columbia’s
Adaptation Strategy (February 2010), online (pdf): <www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/environment/climatechange/adaptation/adaptation_strategy.pdf> [perma.cc/AY3S-2GRP]. The strategy concentrates on
observing and forecasting changes and supporting scienti¿c research into ongoing effects of climate
change.
135. Ouranos Report, supra note 15 at 85-86, discussing BC Hydro’s use of real-time thermal rating
monitors on its transmission and distribution networks to monitor heat sag.
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awareness, making it dif¿cult for corporations to anticipate possible
regulatory responses. This uncertainty is yet another dimension of what
this article has identi¿ed as a new corporate risk.
&RQFOXVLRQ
This article has outlined the implications of climate change impacts on
critical energy infrastructure in Canada and has concluded that climate
change poses signi¿cant risks for the owners and operators of the critical
infrastructure. As discussed, corporate risks in this context can take the
form of either direct risks to the critical asset and to the corporation, or
indirect risks when the critical asset is viewed within its broader economic,
ecological and social geography. Once these indirect risks are included in
a risk analysis, an expanded understanding of climate impacts follows,
resulting in what this article has termed a new corporate risk. How can
corporations navigate such an expanded category of corporate risk?
In the ¿rst instance, corporations must recognize that the direct and
indirect impacts of climate change on their operations pose serious risks
to business activities and business continuity. The pressing questions then
become who should be responsible for leading, implementing and paying
for climate adaptation? On a strict risk management approach, climate
adaptation falls exclusively within the domain of the corporation as owner
and operator of the infrastructure. The corporation alone should decide
how best to achieve physical resilience of its assets and to undertake
“responses to maintain business as usual.”136 However, as this article has
argued, when the critical energy infrastructure asset is viewed within an
expanded understanding of the asset’s relevant geographical context,
i.e., within its broader economic, social, and environmental context,
climate adaptation inevitably becomes both a private and public matter.
Governmental presence will therefore likely occur, including in the form
of regulation, and the question of climate adaptation may also become
politicised.
This potential for private and public interests in climate adaptation
can be illustrated by the question of costs, which has been identi¿ed as
the most signi¿cant barrier to adaptation.137 To date, corporations have
136. European Commission, Climate Action, “Financial Institutions, Insurance and Private Sector”
(accessed 15 August 2019), online: <ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/adaptation/¿nancing/others_en>
[perma.cc/AG8T-KYVZ].
137. Julia Berry & Lisa Danielson, “Paying for Urban Infrastructure Adaptation in Canada: An
Analysis of Existing and Potential Economic Instruments for Local Governments” (June 2015) at
49, online: 6LPRQ)UDVHU8QLYHUVLW\ <summit.sfu.ca/item/17659> [perma.cc/V2S3-U3PH];See also
Martin Parry et al, “Assessing the costs of adaptation to climate change: A review of the UNFCCC and
other recent estimates” (2009), online (pdf): ,QWHUQDWLRQDO,QVWLWXWHIRU(QYLURQPHQWDQG'HYHORSPHQW
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typically restricted their perception of costs in the context of climate
impacts to those related to damages arising from those impacts. They
have not yet fully embraced the actual cost of undertaking climate
adaptation.138 Furthermore, in recognition of the fact that their critical
energy infrastructure assets provide a public good, corporations may be
reluctant to internalize the full costs of adaptation. They may look to the
public for a sharing of these costs, which will make the discussion on costs
a political one.
Another potential area for the corporation to navigate in regard to the
new corporate risk set out in the article is the question of responsibility and
leadership on climate adaptation. A factor contributing to the new corporate
risk is the fact that currently there is fundamental uncertainty related to the
allocation of responsibility on leadership and implementation of climate
adaptation in Canada. Given the public dimension of climate adaptation,
governmental leadership may in fact be necessary and welcomed from the
point of view of corporation. Leadership in this area may not necessarily
entail regulation, but could consist of strong policy direction. Either way,
this would assist in providing some guidance and certainty to corporations
in regard to the allocation of climate adaptation responsibilities.
As noted above, to date, neither the federal nor provincial governments
have demonstrated leadership on climate adaptation in the context of
critical energy infrastructure. In light of the national importance of this
infrastructure to Canadian economic and social well-being, it would
appear logical for the federal government to take the lead on adaptation.
Given the urgency of climate change generally, and the need to adequately
prepare Canada for the effects of climate change, it would be prudent for
the federal government to assume an active role on climate adaptation.
Clarity on climate adaptation leadership will be an important ¿rst step to
allow corporations to manage and navigate the new corporate risk.
Ultimately, the key starting point for corporations is to view climate
change and the potential for impacts to critical energy infrastructure as a
new corporate risk as outlined in this article. To do so, corporations must
view the infrastructure asset within its geography. Viewing the asset in
this broader context widens the risk analysis and adaptation responses of
the corporation. In this way, corporations can best plan for and manage
anticipated and unanticipated climate impacts on their assets.

pubs.iied.org/pdfs/11501IIED.pdf! [perma.cc/9WNW-9PG6].
138. See generally Boyle, VXSUD note 53.

